state. This body, when active, is called a sovereignty when compared with other states, it is called simply a power. The members, spoken of collectively, are called people; spoken of severally, they may be called citizens; and each member, being under the control of the whole body, is, in this respect, a subject.

injurious to itself. In the social compact every individual enters into an engagement with himselfó in the laws of the public body, each member lays an obligation upon himselfó and in obeying those laws, each yields obedience to himself. In such a state, every member is as much bound by the laws, as he is by a bond subscribed to by his own hand. These principles apply, with equal force, to representative governments. When, agreeably to the constitution, a hundred men choose one person to represent them in enacting laws, they give him all their own power; he is their agent and substitute; his voice is the voice of his constituents; his consent to a measure is as binding upon the hundred as their own.

of hundreds that refuse to accept it, when legally chosen. And when the supreme power chooses a person for any office, it acts wholly in subordination to law. The sovereign power has no right to tax an individual; but it has a right to tax all the individuals of the state, with any sums that the public safety requires.

is a subject of that poweró and a few only; who are public servants, are vested with the right of administering the laws.

subject as that individual in the society of a thousand members. Hence it so follows that in proportion as the number of citizens is increased, the liberty of each is diminished. In a small parish an individual has a great proportion of influence; but in a large state, a single voice is almost lost among the multitude. If these proposition are true it so follows that the less proportion each will bears to the will of the whole, the less influence will manners have in preserving the peace of society; and of course the force of laws must be augmented in proportion. But as the opportunities for magistrates to abuse their power are multiplied in proportion to the magnitude of the state, the power of the legislature to restrain and punish the magistrates ought to be increased in the same proportion.

While these interests are divided, government must of course be feeble. Unite them and government becomes active and energetic. Suppose the executive power all vested in an individual; the whole interest of the magistracy is blended with that of the individual; and this union of the two most active principles, renders government as energetic as possible. Hence we deduce the foregoing maxim that the number of magistrates ought to be in an inverse proportion to the magnitude of the state, the consequence of which is that a monarchical form of government is best for large states.

power may be sanctified by time, custom or hereditary succession, the exercise of it, in a single instance, is an act of tyranny. The king of Great-Britain cannot make a single law binding upon his subjects, but he can defeat every bill that is proposed by parliament. Is such a nation free? The English boast of their privileges, and with some reason, when they draw a comparison between themselves and the vassals of a Polish nobleman. But when compared with the eternal immutable rights of man, their privileges shrink into insignificance. With what face can a nation boast of their liberties, when an individual of that nation can, with a single expression, the king will consider it, defeat any measure that the parliament may adopt? Neither the title nor the dignities of royalty can make a king more honest or less fallible than another man; and upon the principles of natural right, any member of parliament might as well negative an act of that body, as the king. A nation which is subject to the will of an individual is a nation of slaves; whether that nation receives its laws from the arbitrary will of its sovereign, or whether the people reserve to themselves the right of making their own laws and give their sovereign full power to annihilate them at pleasure. In either case a nation is at the mercy of an individual.*

*the sole exclusive right of levying taxes is vested in the house of commons; and is the only constitutional privilege of legislation in the English nation; unless we rank the right of dethroning and electing their king for mal-administration, among their constitutional privileges.

all the members of the legislature, they are combined to oppress their subjects, and when they clash, as often happens the state is torn with dissensions and civil war.

It will be laid that I have described a system of government, excellent in theory, but impracticable. It will be alleged that all kinds of government have been attempted by mankind, and that all the efforts of knowledge and virtue have proved ineffectual to preserve the rights of men, from the grasp of ambition or from the gradual approaches of corruption.

have been converted, by power and artifice; into instruments of tyranny. Thus mankind have been deluded from age to age and rendered subservient to the caprice, the pleasure and the ambition of their sovereigns.

always to keep in mind the material distinctions between the constitution, the laws and the administration of a government. Several nations, ancient and modern, furnish us with most excellent systems of law; all nations of any consequence furnish us with the most illustrious examples of upright, judicious magistrates; but history has not recorded a single instance of a wise constitution of civil government. Singular as this assertion may appear, I, believe it may be clearly demonstrated.

ancient privileges of the Patricians and the rights of the Plebeians. Hence the insolence of the former and the jealousy of the latter incessantly embroiled the state. Treaties and temporary concessions, with some attempts to compromise differences by a code of laws and the establishment of new officers among the Plebeians, had some effect in suspending the dissensions which from time to time disturbed the peace of the state. But no application of partial remedies can elect a radical cure in a disordered constitution. Excellent laws and wise magistracy may palliate, but can never remove the disorders that proceed from defects in the original frame of government. The discord which rent the Roman state, was the inevitable, the necessary consequence of a constitutional separation of interests; and could not cease, till these interests were blended together, or the interest of one party was annihilated or silenced by superior force. This last event took place in Rome. An ambitious general, at the head of a veteran army, which had been accustomed to conquer, destroyed the liberties of the people, in a tingle day, on the plains of Pharsalia. The privileges of the senate were apparently respected for several hundred years; but a standing army at the command of the emperor, in effect annihilated their power, and they gradually lost both their name and existence.

vigors exertions in opposition to the encroachments of tyranny, and those exertions have been attended with the best success. But in defiance of all the efforts of a brave and enlightened nation, the body of the people is reduced to a situation, little or nothing superior to the vassalage of the neighboring nations. The United Provinces, taught by fatal experience, the evils of a despotic government, framed on their emancipation from Spain, a constitution, distinguished by the most extraordinary jealousy. The supreme power, not deliberation brought to a point, but remaining in several separate assemblies, is destitute of all energy. Their measures are always now and commonly ineffectual. In cases of extreme danger, the states general have been obliged to infringe the constitution to save the provinces from ruin. And after all their jealousy, they have lost the rights of a free people, by their own folly; and their present form of government is a kind of divided commercial aristocracy, without the benefits of a popular representation or the security of an energetic administration.

who were lords of the soil, and could command the service of their tenants when they pleased, were originally the possessors of all the civil power. But it was the policy and the ambition of their kings to abridge their power and humble their pride. This could not be effected but by enlarging the privileges of the people and thus attaching them to the crown. In this manner and by the edge of the sword, the enormous power of the nobility was much circumscribed in every European kingdom, except Poland; and in most of them the people obtained a share in legislation. In England, the people, sword in hand, obtained from king Stephen and the Barons, magna charta the great basis of all the freedom that was ever enjoyed in that kingdom. Their subsequent struggles were attended with much violence, but generally terminated in the acquisition of new privileges.

cloathed with royalty indeed, but neither wiser nor better for his dignity, has full power to negative every act of parliament and disappoint all the measures of national wisdom.

hereditary distinctions and offices, with religious establishments, are alone sufficient to destroy the liberties of a state and support any system of domination however absurd or oppressive. One or all of these evils are interwoven into every government in Europe, unless some of the cantons of Switzerland, or some small cities should be exceptions.

gradual alterations, and from time to time make such amendments as circumstances will permit, and the rights of mankind require. But the rights of primogeniture, hereditary rights of legislation, and systems of religion established by law, those institutions and customs that infringe all the sacred rights of mankind, and reproach human nature, are perhaps become too closely connected with the peace of society, to be abolished, either by a single stroke of power, or the gradual improvements of policy.

their pretended privileges. Wise laws and upright administration may correct temporary and accidental evils; but can never reform a fundamental error, as an anodyne will alleviate the pains of a disease; but will not effect a radical cure.

nor awed by the frowns of a tyrant. Their civil policy is or ought to be the result of, the collected wisdom of all nations, and their religion, that of the Savior of mankind. If they do not establish and perpetuate the best systems of government on earth, it will be their own fault, for nature has given them every advantage they could desire.

*Several writers on government and particularly the great Montesquieu, maintain that virtue is the foundation of republics. If, by virtue, is meant patriotism, or disinterested public spirit, and love of one's country, as is probably the case; with the utmost respect for such authorities, I must deny that such a general principle ever did or ever can exist in human society. Local attachments exist under every species of government. They are as strong in monarchies as in republics. Honor, which is said to be the principle of monarchical governments, is often as powerful a motive in republics. The real principle that is predominat in every individual and directs all his actions is self-interelt. This operates differently and takes different names in different forms of governrnent. In a democracy, where offices and preferment are at the disposal of the people, an ambitious man must court the people, by hys condescension, by public acts of beneficence, and by pretentions to public good. In order to retain any emoluments, which he holds by the choice of the people, his conduct must be agreeable to them, and apparently, if not really for their interelts. This conduct springs from self-love, but takes the name of virtue or public spirit. In a monarchy, where the sovereign disposes of posts of honor and profit, and where distinction of rank takes place, a candidate takes a different method to procure favor. He professes the most unshaken loyalty, and a firm attachment to the person of his sovereign; he assumes an air of dignity and shapes his conduct to the humour of the court. This is the same selfish principle, aiming at the same object; but operating in a different manner, it is denominated honor. But the existence of any form of government does not depend on any principle of action, however modified, or by whatever name distinguished.

of the rights of primogeniture, which the wisdom of succeeding legislatures will undoubtedly abolish. An act passed the legislature of NewYork, a few years past, destroying and barring entailments and ordering that all intestate estates should descend to all the heirs in equal portions. No act was ever better timed or calculated to produce more salutary effects. The states of Pennsylvania and North Carolina have made it an article in their Constitutions, that no estates shall be perpetual. I am not sufficiently acquainted with the constitutions of the other states, to inform whether perpetuities are barred or not; but they may be avoided by a common recovery, a fiction often practiced in the English courts of law.

equal distribution of property. The local situation of all the states and the genius of the inhabitants in most of them, tend to destroy all the aristocratic which ideas were introduced from our parent country.

*The jealousy even of the southern states in regard to the establishment of rank and hereditary titles, was remarkable in the opposition which appeared against the Cincinnati. The original design of that society, was not only harmless, but extremely laudable. It was a monument raised to the memory of an army which desended the noblest cause ever undertaken by man. But perhaps the plan involved in it consequences which were not apprehended by the gentlemen who formed it. There is however some difficulty in conceiving how a mere title, without property and legislative rights, could endanger our liberties. Evil consequences might result from such a society; but they must be extremely remote. It must require the continued efforts of several generations to accumulate a dangerous degree of power in a society, consisting of few members, who would be scattered throughout the continent.

Another circumstance, favorable to liberty and peculiar to America, is a most liberal plan of ecclesiastical policy. Dr. Price has anticipated most of my observations on this head. If sound sense is to be found on earth, it is in his reasoning on this subject. The American constitutions are the most liberal in this particular of any on earth; and yet some of them have retained some badges of bigotry. A profession of the Christian religion is necessary in the states, to entitle a man to office. In some states, it is requisite to subscribe certain articles of faith. These requisitions are the effect of the same abominable prejudices, that have enslaved the human mind in all countries; which alone have supported error and all absurdities in religion. If there are any human means of promoting a millenial state of society, the only means are a general diffusion of knowledge and a free unlimited indulgence given to religious persuasions, without distinction and without preference. When this event takes place, and I believe it certainly will, the best religion will have the most advocates. Nothing checks the progress of truth like human establishments. Christianity spread with rapidity, before the temporal powers interferred; but when the civil magistrate undertook to guard the truth from error, its progress was obstructed, the simplicity of the gospel was corrupted with human inventions, and the efforts of Christendom have not yet been able to bring it back to its primitive purity.

The general education of youth is an article in which the American states are superior to all nations. In Great Britain the arts and sciences are cultivated to perfection but the instruction of the lower classes of people is by no means equal to the American yeomanry. The institution of schools, particularly in the New England states, where the poorest children are instructed in reading, writing and arithmetic, at the public expense, is a noble regulation, calculated to dignify the human species.

*An officer of the New York line, in the late war, who had an opportunity to be particularly acquainted with the New England troops has told me repeatedly, that he found the non-commissoned officer in the Connecticut line, better educated than the commissioned officiers of the New York troops. An officer in Pennsylvania regiment, informed me that he found many officers of the line on their establishment who could not make out the regimental returns. The flourishing state of South Carolina never had an academy till within a few months past. I cannot learn that North Carolina has yet my kind of college or academy. A few gentlemen send their sons to Europe for an education.

rare to find a person who cannot read and write; but if I am rightly informed, the case is different in the southern states. The education, however, of the common people in every part of America, is equal to that of any nation; and the southern states, where schools have been much neglected, are giving more encouragement to literature.

I HAVE already mentioned three principles which have generally operated in combining the members of society under some supreme power; a standing army, religion and fear of an external force. A standing army is necessary in all despotic governments. Religion, by which I mean superstition, or human systems of absurdity, is an engine used in almost all governments, and has a powerful effect where people are kept in ignorance. The fear of conquest is an infallible bond of union where states are surrounded by martial enemies. After people have been long accustomed to obey, whatever be the first motive of their obedience, there is formed a habit of subordination, which has an almost irresistible influence, and which will preserve the tranquillity of government, even when coercion or the first principle of obedience has ceased to operate.

*if the states cannot be brought to act in concert now, how can it be done when the number of the states is augmented and the inhabitants multiplied to many millions?

*People, in the choice of rulers, are too apt to he deceived by an ******* address and a specious show of popular virtues. I pretend not to layt down rules for other people; but for my own part, I will never give my vote to a man who courts my favor. I always suspect that such a man will be the first to betray me. Nor, will I give my vote to men, merely because they have been in office and it will hurt their feelings to be neglected. Such motives appear to me to discover weakness and a disregard to the true principles of government. I endeavour to give my votes to men, in whose integrity and abilities I can repose considenceó men, who will not dispense with law and rigid justice, to favor a friend or secure their own popularity. When I hear people talk of elevating a man to an office, because be comes next in course, and he will do well enough, I suspect they have forgot that they are freemen, and have lost their oaths or their consciences.

Let a similar system of government be extended to the United States. As towns and cities are, as to their small matters, sovereign and independent, and as to their general concerns, mere subjects of the state; so let the several states, as to their own police, be sovereign and independent, but as to the common concerns of all, let them be mere subjects of the federal head. If the necessity of a union is admitted, such a system is the only means effecting it. However independent each state may be and ought to be in things that relate to itself merely, yet as a part of a greater body, it must be a subject of that body, in matters that relate to the whole.

*such a form of Government resembles the harmony nature in the planetary system. The moon is an inferior planet subject to the earth. The earth and other planets govern their secondary planets and at the same time, are governed by the sun, the common center of our system: And it is highly probable that the sun may be a planet, governed by some other great central body or power. A gradation, similar to this, is obvious in the animal world.

salutary measures of the states, proposed by Congress and acceded to by twelve out of thirteen.*

* The manner in which the impost of five percent has been prevented by the state of Rhode Island is well known. It is a disgrace to any government on earth. That state has a local interest in no complying with the measure. A state impost brings more than it consumes, the duty on goods not consumed there, is clear gain. This a state by its local situation is enabled to pay its debts and support government with money collected in the neighboring states. If such a selfish system is suffered to prevail, let us dissolve the confederation, and let every state make the most of its strength and advantages by filching from its neighbors. In such a game Rode Island will lose.
**A delegate from Connecticut, who was in Congress when the half-pay resolution was debated, resolutely opposed the measure. But when it had legally passed by a majority of voices, he acquiesced, and has ever defended the measure; even at the hazard of his reputation. If there is any characteristic of an honest man and a good subject, it is such a line of conduct.

variety of prerogatives given them by the articles of confederation. In this case we ourselves and the state of Europe, should know what kind of a being Congress isó what dependence can be placed on their resolvesó what is the nature of the treaties which they have made and the debts they have contracted.

*Congress ordered a number of troops to be raised for taking possession of the frontier posts and defending them from the savages. A year has elapsed since this order and the troops are now mostly at home. The enemy still hold our forts, possess the fur trade and ravage our new settlements. Such weakness in government is infamy.

for civil war, the sword must settle the contest and the weakest be sacrificed to the strongest.

*Congress have been more careful of our liberties; for the articles of confederation ordain, that, in matters of great national concern, the concurrence, not of seven states, a mere majority, but of nine should be requisite to pass a resolution.

independent, of each other, and liable to all the evils of jealousy, dispute and civil dissensionó nay, liable to a civil war upon any clashing of interests; or they must contribute a general head, composed of representatives from all the states, and vested with the power of the whole continent to enforce their decisions. There is no other alternative. One of these events must inevitably take place, and the revolution of a few years will verify the prediction.

prescription or hereditary right; but all at the disposal of the people, and not a man on the continent, but drones and villains, who has not the privilege of frequently choosing his legislators and impeaching his magistrates for mal-administration. Such principles form the basis of our American governments; the first and only governments on earth that are founded on the true principles of equal liberty and properly guarded from corruption.

*In eleven states. In the other two, they are elected by the people. This is a defect, however, in the constitutions of those states, as the delegates, when chosen by the people, are immediately removable by the assembly and their place may be supplied without a reason given. The privilege of the people therefore nothing.

become tyrants. A measure partially oppressive may be resolved upon, but while the principles of representation, which are always in the power of the people, remain uncorrupted, such a measure can be of no long continuance. The best constitution of government may degenerate from its purity, through a variety of causes; but the confederation of these states is better secured than any government on earth, and less liable to corruption from any quarter.

debts of the states unpaid and accumulating, national faith violated, commerce restricted and insulted, one state filching some interest from another, and the whole body, linked together by cobwebs and shadows, the jest and the ridicule of the world. This is not a chimerical description; it is a literal representation of facts as they now exist. One State found it could make some advantages by refusing the impost. Congress have reasoned with their legislature, and by incontrovertible proofs have pointed out the impropriety of the refusal, but all to no purpose. Thus one fiftieth part of the states counteracts a measure that the other states suppose not only beneficial, but necessary; a measure, on which the discharge of our public debt and our national faith, most obviously depend. Can a government, thus feeble and disjointed answer any valuable purpose? Can commutative justice between the States ever be obtained? Can public debts be discharged and credit supported? Can America ever be respected by her enemies, when one of her own states can, year after year, abuse her weakness with impunity? No, the American States, so celebrated for their wisdom and valour in the late struggle for freedom and empire, will be the contempt of nations, unless they can unite their force and carry into effect all the constitutional measures of Congress, whether those measures respect themselves or foreign nations.

could exist, if every man assumed the right of sacrificing his neighbors property to his own interest? Are there no rights to be relinquished, no sacrifices to be made for the sake of enjoying the benefits of civil government? if every town in Rhode Island, even the smallest could annihilate every act of the legislature, could that State exist? Were such a selfish system to prevail generally, there would be an end of government and civil society would become a curse. A social state would be less eligible than a savage state, in proportion as knowledge would be increased and knaves multiplied. Local inconveniences and local interests never ought to disappoint a measure of general utility. If there is not power enough in government to remedy these evils, by obliging private interests to give way to public, discord will pervade the State, and terminate in a revolution. Such a power must exist somewhere, and if people will quarrel with good government, there are innumerable opportunities for some daring ambitious genius to erect monarchy on civil dissensions. In America, there is no danger of an aristocracy; but the transition from popular anarchy to monarchy, is very natural and often very easy. If these States have any change of government to fear, it is a monarchy. Nothing but the creation of a sovereign power over the whole, with authority to compel obedience to legal measures, can ever prevent a revolution in favor of one monarchy or more. This event may be distant, but is not the less certain. America, has it now in her power to create a supreme power over the whole continent, sufficient to answer all the ends of government, without abridging the rights or destroying the sovereignty of a single state. But should the extreme jealousy of the States, prevent the lodgment of such a power in a body of men chosen by themselves and removable at pleasure, such a power will inevitably create itself in the course of events.

their resolutions. It is there laid what powers shall be exercised by Congress; but no penalty is annexed to disobedience. What purpose would the laws of a State answer, if they might be evaded with impunity? and is there were no penalty annexed to a breach of them? A law without a penalty is mere advice, a magistrate, without the power of punishing, is a cypher. Here is the great defect in the articles of our federal government. Unless Congress can be vested with the same authority to compel obedience to their resolutions, that a legislature in any State has to enforce obedience to the laws of that State, the existence of such a body is entirely needless and will not be of long duration. I repeat what I have before said. The idea of governing thirteen States and uniting their interests by mere resolves and recommendation, without any penalty annexed to a noncompliance, is a ridiculous farce, a burlesque on government, and a reproach to America.

than the prejudices of the southern states against New England manners. They deride our manners and by that derision betray the want of manners themselves. However different may be the customs and fashions of different states, yet those of the southern are as ridiculous as those of the northern. The fact is, neither one nor the other are the subjects of ridicule and contempt. Particular districts have local peculiarities; but custom gives all an equal degree of propriety. It is remarked of the Greeks as a great indelicacy of manners, that they held all the world, except themselves, to be barbarians. The people of Congo think the world to be the work of angels; except their own country, which they hold to be the work of the supreme architect. The Greenlanders make a mock of Europeans or Kablunets, as they call them. They despise arts and sciences and value themselves on their skill in catching fish, which they conceive to be the only useful art.* Just as absurd as these, are the prejudices between the states. Education will gradually eradicate them, and a growing intercourse will harmonize the feelings and the views of all the citizens.

*A fashionable buck in Carolina despises literature. A man science with address of the beau monde, is ridiculed and placed almost among the servants. In the southern states, gaming, fox hunting and horse racing are the height of ambition; industry is reserved for slaves. In the northern states, industry and the cultivation of the arts and science, distinguishe the people. Which discover the best tastes?

other by its extent and wealth, detracts so much from the strength and harmony of the union. In order to have our union complete and permanent, all the states should have an equal influence in public deliberations. The want of such equality is a capital misfortune#151 it had well nigh prevented our confederation#151 and has produced other sensible inconveniences.

from civil offices and thus make them foes to the government by a most tyrannical distinction. Such an exclusion therefore produces the very effect, which it was intended to prevent The state of New York is a witness of this truth. Add to this the inevitable tendency of such an exclusion to discourage men of knowledge and liberality from entering into a most useful and necessary profession. Surely no State ought to interweave, into its constitution, a general discouragement of a profession, calculated at least to promote the peace and happiness of society. Should I be asked what privileges clergymen ought to enjoy? I would answer, the same as other citizens. This would annihilate their power as a body, by scattering its force, by leveling a distinction of orders, and blending the civil and ecclesiastical interests in one indivisible interest.

But then is no reasoning with custom nor with fashion. We shall probably, learn the arts and virtues of Europeans; but certainly,

their vices and follies. In politics, our weakness will render us the dupes of their power and artifice; in manners, we shall be the slaves of their barbers and their coxcombs.