I will warn you to get a drink and settle down for my Reader's Digest version of my time at Douglas Aircraft Company (DAC).

I hired into McDonnell Douglas in February 1990 as a UAW - Quality Assurance - Electronic First Article Inspector (FAI). Now, aside from an FAA inspection, this was the most rigorous inspection that DAC conducted on itself. My job was to inspect the planning, engineering, manufacturing and quality processes, drawings & other documents (as well as the actual first installation) of any newly developed electrical or electronic system that was destined for the MD-11 aircraft. All MD-11 electrical systems were FAA mandated to go by my (or my 10 avionic counterparts) eyes. We worked on everything, including the #2 engine re-wiring design brought on by the United DC-10 Sioux City, Iowa crash.

About 1 year later, due to my solid reputation and appetite to expand my knowledge, I was promoted to the salaried world and took a job with the Quality (Assurance) Planning group - known internally as QP's. This group's primary mission is to review the Assembly Orders (AO's) or Advanced Assembly Orders (AAO's)-the documents that the actual worker uses as instructions to build the plane. We checked for sufficient & timely inspection points and adequate references to the appropriate engineering documents as the product is being built. We were also responsible for identifying and flagging these build documents for FAA or FAI inspection requirements, which were perceived as much more rigorous than a "typical" inspection.

It was during this time that I was shown dozens of glaring build paper omissions (like no reference to the correct engineering, manufacturing or QA specifications on the paper). This was the tip of my Titanic iceberg of the whole DAC quality problem picture. With the help of a few skilled mentors, I quickly learned navigate the electronic mainframe computer maze of the MD-11 electronic build process from start to finish. I worked very closely with the FAA Designated Manufacturing Inspection Representatives (DMIR's) and with the Quality Engineers - Corrective Action Investigators. As such, when aircraft problems arose and FAA or Investigators came looking for answers to which group may have done this install or part of the assembly, I could quickly and confidently identify the department, engineering drawing & Douglas Process Standard (DPS) / Douglas Material Standard (DMS), work shift and specific Assembly Order which covered the installation in question. As I began to get involved in these investigations, I was amazed to learn of the general lack of understanding of the electrical world by most company work planners, engineering departments, manufacturing personnel & management (and yes - even QA Inspectors). I started getting worried....

After alittle more than 1 year with the QP group, I was promoted with the QA General Manager's blessing to the position of Quality Engineer - Corrective Action Investigator. My first assignment was that of a Zone Captain. This was a new concept & position at DAC - brought about to reduce the rising tide of defects being found in the production cycle. A Zone Captain is a person who was responsible to oversee particular troublesome areas of the aircraft - meaning poor build quality.

My areas were the Cockpit and the Engines - arguably 2 of the 4 most important electronic areas of the MD-11 - aside from the Main Avionics Rack (MAR) & the Center Access Compartment (CAC). Here I found the depth of the quality problems at the Douglas Aircraft Company. Problems identified were:

>wirings not properly routed through pressure feed-thru's,

>blatant wire riding conditions (some were excessively hard riding conditions),

>improper wire terminations to lugs, pins or solder sleeve connections,

>lack of planning build paper identification of important steps, such as required employee certifications for so-called Certified Operations,

>missing or outright undefined torque values for heavy gauge wiring or cables (14 gauge to 000 gauge).

The list goes on & on....& apathy of the workers to my calls for quality work was a constant struggle.

After about 6 months, as we were reaching a target goal of reducing quality defects or "escapes" as they were called, I started to get really vocal about the missing Certifications of the workers and the missing torque value issues. This earned me the title of safety nazi, lunatic and next on the lay-off list person. I brought up so many issues that seems so pervasive throughout the ENTIRE manufacturing, planning, engineering and quality worlds, that managers from each organization from low levels to the General Manager & VP's thought I was a loose cannon - out criticizing their entire production line.

As typical, I was silenced by being removed from the position and moved into the illustrious MRCC building, where I would spend my extensive talent and training in disposition-ing broken or defective parts. Basically, if I couldn't get near an airplane, they could keep me quiet (or so the thought went). Well, I started doing my typical job of investigation on the various black boxes that were coming thru my scrap center and I started bringing in the various avionic vendors to help identify the causes of the repetitive failures of say, the autopilot system, or the engine throttle controls, or the hydraulic actuators or servos for the flight controls surfaces. As a team, we found that DAC had (in some or all of the cases) either contributed or caused the damage to the part, due to either inadequate work instructions, lack of proper procedure references, repeated disregard for work instructions or using non-certified personnel to perform critical system work.

With the vendors and soon the DAC engineers on my side, and armed with a mountain of data from my own archived AO & Non-Conformance document library and our Product In-Service groups, Quality Assurance management had no choice but to bring me out of exile and back into the group - seeing as how know one else could seemingly get their arms around the breadth & extremity of the situation facing them. They decided to put me on as 1 of 2 investigators of the most important electrical problems that occurred to the MD-11 program (the other was my Marine Corps roommate who had the exact same resume as me).

Once again, I could investigate virtually everything that plugged into the airplane. In the ensuing 2 years, I conducted somewhere in the neighborhood of 400-600 documented investigations on everything from flight safety issues to more mundane (but equally important) wire clamping and riding conditions. Some of these investigations required FAA involvement, DAC issued Service Bulletins and Airworthiness Directives (the most critical of fleet wide inspections announcements).  If there was an event happening in the electronic side of the MD-11 construction during 1992 to late 1995 - I was the goto guy to get the problem root cause identified, oversee implementation of corrective actions and to notify our in-service group to alert the airlines. I again became increasingly fanatical about the poor electrical build quality of the MD-11 (and by default MD80 & MD90's).  Finally, after much sole searching and consultations with various individuals I trusted, and due to a lack of what I considered to be adequate action on management's part, I turned over several boxes of data to the FAA Principal Manufacturing Inspector (PMI) on site. I relayed my attempts over the last 4 years to training, educate, force or otherwise coerce the various agencies into compliance, most times without success.

The FAA began a 6 month investigation on the subject and I was tapped by QA management to assist them in the audit of aircraft and completed aircraft paper work. In the end, the FAA decided to fine DAC a paltry $600,000 or so in a civil lawsuit for errors related missing Certified Operations callouts on the build papers and for un-certified employees performing certified work. Although I felt vindicated to a certain extent, I felt the FAA's findings were extremely limited in scope and in punishment. Certain positive changes were made, but it was estimated that it would take 1 - 2 years for the entire change to be implemented. By this time, I had grown weary of the fight, and having a hollow FAA victory didn't help matters. I took a job with the Senior Manager of MD80 / 90 Quality Assurance as his Staff assistant. I dealt less with commercial aircraft issues and more with headcount ratios, target reductions of quality inspection points and rollouts of various Total Quality Management (TQM) initiatives designed to make the manufacturing worker more responsible for inspecting his/her own work.  A scary prospect in this particular environment.

I quit Douglas Aircraft in disgust on July 1st, 1997 and never looked back to the aviation industry I spent the my last 14 years working in or studying.  I did an interview with Swiss National Radio in 1998 about some of my concerns of the MD-11's electrical system integrity and have thrown away large numbers of documents and manuals that I used to have documenting them.  Seeing those boxes in my closet gave me pits in my stomach each time I'd see them. Nowadays, I work in the Technology group of KPMG, managing national hardware & software projects. I am considering a career in law, with an emphasis on Product Liability.....maybe even in the volatile area of transportation.  J